Microeconometric Models of Consumer and Producer Demand with Limited Dependent Variables by Lee, Lung-Fei & Pitt, Mark M.
Bulletin  Number 84-4
ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT  CENTER  - _  --  --
MICROECONOMETRI  MODELS OF
CONSUMER ANDPRODUAER  DEMAND  WIH
L  ITED DEPENENT  VARIABtS
Lung-FeiLee
MarkM. Pitt
Department  f Ag ri  and  ied  i  Pa
--
-- _  --  --  ----  -
Department of Ag  Mcufu  aRl  dppfie  ot_
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
r
October 1984MICROECONOMETRIC MODELS  OF CONSUMER AND
PRODUCER DEMAND WITH LIMITED DEPENDENT VARIABLES
by
Lung-Fei  Lee
Department  of  Economics









The  specification  and  estimation  of  models  of  consumer  and  producer  demand  with  kink
points  are considered.  The presence of kink points divides the demand or production
schedule into different regimes.  Our approach utilizes the concept of virtual
prices.  The virtual  prices transform  binding quantities  into nonbinding ones  and
provide a  rigorous justification for structural  change  in  the observed demand func-
tions across regimes.  The comparison of virtual  prices with market prices deter-
mines  regime  occurences.  An  application  to  energy  demand  in  Indonesian  manufacturing
firms based on  the translog cost function  is  provided,MICROECONOMETRIC MODELS OF CONSUMER AND
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1.  Introduction.
A  number of recent studies  (Pitt, 1983a;  Deaton and Irish  (1982); Strauss
(1983))  have used household level  data  to estimate demand relationships and firm-
level  data  to  estimate  the  derived  demand  for  inputs  (Pitt,  1984).  These  micro  data
sets are often from developing countries where poor infrastructure and market
separation provide price variability in  cross-section.  Micro data offer a  number of
important advantages over aggregated data.  For example,  household age and sex com-
position  are  considered  major  determinants  of  expenditure  patterns  but  their  effects
are not easily measured with aggregated data.  Unfortunately, many studies  using
micro data  suffer from the  lack of an unrestrictive and theoretically consistent
approach to dealing with a  common attribute of these data, the non-  (or otherwise
bounded) consumption or production of goods by households or firms.  With the in-
creased availability of micro data it  is  important that this econometric problem be
resolved so  that the interpretation of results is  unclouded  by econometric  incon-
sistency.
Zero corner solutions  are the special  case of a  kink point which occurs on  the
boundary of the choice set of a  consumer or producer.  Kink  points may occur for
other reasons,  such as  block pricing or rationing.  Kink points are usually atoms in
probability space and hence, for econometric  analysis, imply  limited dependent vari-
ables.  However, the estimation of theoretically consistent demand or production
structures differs from the well-known limited dependent variable models of Tobin
(1958) and Amemiya  (1974) in that these structures involve complex  structural  inter--2-
actions and cross-equation  restrictions.
Recently, Wales and Woodland  (1983) have considered the problem of estimating
consumer demand systems with  binding non-negativity constraints.  Their econometric
model  was derived directly from a  random utility function maximized subject to a
budget constraint.  As  is  well-known,  demand equations can also be  derived from an
indirect utility function or cost function by application of Roy's  identity.  Fur-
thermore, any demand system which adds  up,  is  homogeneous of degree zero and has
symmetric, negative definite compensated price response is  integrable into a
theoretically consistent preference ordering  (Hurwicz and Uzawa, 1971).  This  dual
approach  has proved advantageous in  practice.  It  is  easier to  specify demand, cost
or indirect utility functions  than  direct utility functions.  Systems of demand
equations are easily derived from popular flexible functional  forms, such  as the
translog.  The dual  approach  has a  particular advantage in  the specification and
estimation of multiple input-multiple output production  structures  (McKay, Lawrence
and Vlastrin, 1983;  Weaver, 1983).
In  this  paper, we propose a  unified approach to the estimation of demand sys-
tems with  limited dependent variables.  Our approach can estimate  demand system
derived directly from a  utility function or indirectly through duality.  Contra-
dicting the claim of Wales and Woodland  (p.  273) that the indirect  utility approach
is  inappropriate for dealing with non-negativity constraints,  we show that such an
approach is  not only possible  but also useful.  Our approach is  in  the tradition of
the theory of consumer demand under rationing set forth in  Houthakker  (1950-51),
Pollak  (1969, 1970),  Howard  (1977), Neary and Roberts  (1980), and Deaton  (1981),  and
utilizes the concept of virtual  prices originated by Rothbarth  (1941).-3-
2.  The Consumer's Problem With a  Convex Budget Set.
Convex budget sets result naturally  from binding non-negativity constraints  but
also  from quantity rationing and increasing block pricing.  All  of these sources of
convexity  can  be  analyzed  within  a  common  framework.  Consider  the  case  of  two  goods
with non-negativity constraints and increasing block pricing for the first good
(Figure  1).  The  marginal  unit  price  for  quantities  of  xi  less  than  or  equal  to
x  (1)  is  P11i  and  p12'  (P12  > Pl ) '   for quantities  greater  than  x,(l).  With
income  M,  the  extended  budget  line  AB  is  Pllx 1 +  P2X 2  = M  and  the  budget  line
BC  is  P 1 2x1  + P2x2  = M +  (p 12 - p11)x 1(l).  The  point  B  is  a  kink  point  as  are
the non-negative  boundary points  A  and  C. Quantity rationing with ration  xl (1)
can  be  regarded as the special  case of  pl2 
=  ~.
FIGURE 1.




0  x 1(l)  xi
In  the  general  multicommodity  case,  every  commodity  may  be  subject  to  increas-
ing  block  pricing.  For  commodity  j,  assume  there  are  I.(I  > 1)  different  block
prices  pjl  < pj2  <  ...  < Pj  corresponding  to  knots  xj(l),...,x.(Ij-1), x1(i)
< x1 (i+l)  for  i  = 1,...,Ij  - 2.  The  case  I  =  1  is  the  standard  single  price
situation.  We  adopt  the  convenient  conventions  x.(0)  =  0  and  xj(Ij)  =  o0  for
notational  simplicity.  The  budget  segmentsare  plilx1  + P2i2x 2  +  ...  + Pmixm  =
M  if  x1(i -
1)  < x1  <x(i 1 ) ,...,xm(im-)  < x,  m  xm(im),  where Mili 2 .. im
x2-4-
i .-1
Mi.  ..  = M +  :  3  (P  p)x()
j1'2"1  0m  =1  1  jZ+1  ji  3
Let  U(x 1,...,x  )  be  a utility function  which  is continuously  differentiable,
increasing  and  strictly quasi-concave.  The  utility maximization  problem  is
max  U(x1, 9 ... ,xm )
Xl,...,Xm
subject  to
j=l  Pji  i  <  M  i  i  =  1  I.. ;
(2.1)




(2.2)  M.  =  M  +  E=1  1  (pj)+1 X  -W
This utility maximization  problem  provides  the  general  framework  for  the  demand
analysis  of this  paper.  It  includes  as  special  cases  quantity  rationing  and  non-
negativity constraints.  The  consumer  problem  with  binding  non-negativity  constraints
and  a single price  for  each  commodity  is  simply
(2.3)  Max  U(Xl,...,xm)
m
subject  to  J=1  pjxj  = M
x  ,  j  = l,...,m.
J  --5-
3.  Regime Criteria and Virtual Prices.
For econometric  analysis it  is  necessary  to determine the probability that an
optimal  solution will  occur at any kink point  (demand regime),  given the values of
the explanatory variables.  For two goods, these conditions are readily obtained
diagrammatically.  Burtless and Hausman  (1978) and Hausman  (1979) have considered
the optimal  solution to  the consumers' problem with two goods and a  convex  budget
set  based on the location of indifference curves.  For the general  case of  m  goods,
we derive below regime switching  criteria using  both Kuhn-Tucker conditions and
virtual  prices.
First, consider the consumers'  problem with only binding non-negativity con-
straints  (2.3).  Assume that the first  a  goods are not consumed,  i.e.,  x*  = 0,
1
i  = 1,...,  and  xt  > 0,  i  =  +l,...,m  where  x* = (x*,  x*,  x*,x,*  0+ x*  )
denotes  the demanded quantity vector.  The Lagrangean function for this problem is
(3.1)  L  = U(x1,...,x m)  +  X(M - m=  pjxj)  +  Ez=  T  j
j=l  P  Xjj  3=13jxj
where  x  and  p's  are  Lagrangean  multipliers.  The  Kuhn-Tucker  conditions  that
characterize  this  solution  x*  are
(3.2)  Ux  - APi  +   =  0,  > 0,  i  = ax i   ... ,
U(x*)  1 (3.3)  a(x*  - p  = 0,  j=  ,..., max  3
(3.4)  j=+1 Pjx  = M  > 0.
Wales and Woodland use the  inequalities,
(3.2)"  1 U*  - p  <  0,  i  = 1,...,£ ax.  i-
1
and equations  (3.3) and  (3.4) to determine-the  choice of regime.  Under some  sto-
chastic utility function specifications  they derive the likelihood function for their-6-
model.  The  inequalities  (3.2)  do  not  have  much  intuitive  content.  Below,  we  demon-
strate that the use of virtual  prices provides a  simple, intuitive interpretation of
regime criteria and a  deeper  insight into the problem.
Virtual  prices  are  simply  those  prices  which  support  a vector  of  demands.  Neary
and  Roberts  have  shown  that  if  the  preference  function  is  strictly  quasi-concave,
continuous  and  strictly  monotonic,  any  allocation  can  be  supported  with  virtual
prices.  Strict monotonicity also implies  that support prices will  be  strictly
positive.  The virtual  price for good  i,  gi,  at  xt  can  be  defined as
Sau(x*)
i  ax  /
(3.5)
=  9U(x*) /  DU(x*)
=  m  xi   x  ,....
For the remaining goods, the virtual  price  Sj  at  x*  is  the  observed  price  pj
for  j  = £+l,...,m.  Hence, the  Kuhn-Tucker conditions  (3.2) are equivalent  to the
inequalities
(3.2)  O  <   i  =  1,...
which compares the virtual  prices of the  nonconsumed goods with their corresponding
market  prices.  The  virtual  price  vector  E,  ')  = (51"'"m)  with income  M,
supports the quantity vector  x*,  which is  the solution to  the unconstrained prob-
lem  max {U(x)IE|x = M}  without non-negativity constraints.  Thus,  virtual prices
x
are shadow prices.  The goods  i, i  =  1,...,£,  are not consumed  because their
market prices exceed their corresponding shadow prices.
Before analyzing  the problem  (2.1),  it  is  instructive to consider the two-goods
case with a single kink point and without any binding non-negativity constraints.
Consider the regime for which the optimum occurs at the kink point  x, x =
(x 1(1),  x2) where  x2 =  (M  - P11x1 (1))/p 2 (see Figure 1).  Consider the utility-7-
maximization  problem,
max  U(x 1,  x2)
xl,  x2
subject  to
P11  +  P2X2  M;
(3.6)
P12Xl  +  P2X2  I<M1
where  M  = M +  (PI2  - P11)xl(1).  The  Lagrangean  function  is
L = U(x 1,  x2)  +  x1(M - P11x1 - P2x2 )  + X2 (M 1  - P 12x1   P2x2 ).
The  Kuhn-Tucker  conditions  that  characterize  the  optimum  regime  at  the  kink  point
x  are
(37)  ~aU(x) (3.7)  ax  1  - 2 11  12 =  0,
(3.8)  ~(  - +  2 2 =  0,
(3.9)  p11~ 1 + P22  = M,  X 1  >  0,
(3.10)  P2X1  +  P2X2  = M1'  X2  >  0.
These  conditions  are  not  of  direct  use  since  these  criteria  are  expressed  as
equalities.  Define  a  variable  (l  as
1  aU(x)
(3.11)  5  +  12  a• 1
where  x1   and  A2  are  solutions  from  (3.7)-(3.10).  Equivalently,
(3.11)-  l  = pa2X  / 2ax 1 ax 2-8-
It  follows  that  equation  (3.7)  can  be  rewritten  as
(3.7)^  1  +"--1 - 12 =  0. +l  + 2  1  2
Equation  (3.7)'  implies  that
(3.12)  l  -P11  2  x 1   P  +  2   P 1 2
and
(3.13)  l  - P12 
=   + X  11
As  p 12 > P11, we  have  S1 > P11  and  Pl2  > -   Thus,  if  the  optimum  occurs  at
the  kink  point,  it  is  necessary  that  pl 2  >  El  > pi 1   That  these  inequalities  are
sufficient  conditions  can  be  shown  as  follows.  Define  w  as
(3.14)  /  = aP2/
2
Since  p2  El  >  p 11,  where  E  = p  ax/  =  x)  /  w,  there  exists  a
2  1 ~  ~ = 1  P2  ax  axx 2   ax1
p  [0,  1]  such  that  El  =  P12  +  (1  - l)P 11. Define  wl  and  w2  as
(3.15)  Ml  =  u1
and
(3.16)  w2  =  (1  - v).
Obviously,  w 1   0,  w2  >  0  and  w = wl  + w2. Thus  we  have
U(x)  - =
x  - 1P12  - m2 Pll ax1
aUU()  _  (wl  + W 2 )P2  =  0
ax 2
P 11X ( 1)  +  P 2x 2 = M,  )1  > - 0-9-
P12x1(1)  +  P2x 2  = M1, W2 > 0
which  are  the  Kuhn-Tucker  conditions  which  characterize  x  as  the  solution.  Hence,
it  can  be  concluded  that  the  regime  criteria  which  determine  this  regime  are  the  in-
equalities
(3.17)  Pll  -1 - <P12*
From  the  constructions  in  (3.14)  and  (3.11),  we  have  essentially that
(3.18)  aU()  p  0 3x 2   P2
(3.19)  U(x)  0.
Define  an  "income"  C  as
(3.20)  C = M +  (  - P11)x(1).
It  follows  that
(3.21)  1xl(1)  +  P2x2  =  C.
Thus  the  plane  {(x I ,  x2)ýi1x 1  + P2x2  = C}  is  tangent  to  the  indifferent  curve  at
the  kink  point  x,  which  is  point  B  in  Figure  1,  and  supports  this  kink  point  as
the  solution  given  the  price  vector  (5E'  P2)  and  income  C.  The  price  1I is  the
virtual  price  for  good  1  at  the  quantity  x1(1),  and  C  is  the  corresponding
virtual  income.  The  kink  point  is  optimal  because  its virtual  (shadow)  price  is
greater  than  the  first block  price  but  less  than  the  second.
The  comparison  of virtual  prices  with  market  prices  can  select  among  regimes  in
the  general  problem  of  the  consumer  with  a  convex  budget  set  (2.1,  2.2).  We  state
the  following  results  with  detailed  proof  omitted:-10-
Theorem  1.  Let  x*  = (x,...,x)  be  the  demanded  quantity  vector.  Consider
the  general  regime  with  the  form:
*=  *=  =*  =0;
1  2  £-1-
(3.22)  x*  =  x  (i  ),  x  = X+l (i 1   ) . =  x  (  )
S£1  1  1+1  l1+1  1+1  Z'"  22-1  - 1  2  2-1I
x  (i2-1)  <  x*  <  x2(i  ),.  .. ,x(m  - 1)  <  X* <  x (i) £2  2  2  mm  m  mm
where  0 <  <  < m  and  for  some  i  i  .... ,  The  necessary  and  suf- I1  k  2<  mZ1'  1+  1  m
ficient conditions  for this  regime's  occurrence  are:
Pj1  > -  j(x*),  j  =  1,  2,...,9  -1;
(3.23)  pjio  <  j(x*)  iPjj(iý+)  =  19'  1+1,..,2 -1;
3  3
xj(i  -l)  < xj  <  x  (i  )   j  =  2,  2+1,...,m,
where  Ej(x*)  is the virtual  price of  good  j  at  the  optimum  point  x*.
In  principle,  virtual  prices  can  be  constructed  from  either  the  direct or  in-
direct utility functions.  Consider  the  case  where  z  goods  are  rationed  at  the
quantities  x  ,  i  =  i,...,z.  With  a utility function  U(x , ... ,x  ),  a price  vec-
tor  p  and  income  M,  the  constrained  utility maximization  problem  is
(3.24)  max  U(xl,...,xz, x£+l,...,xm) x
subject  to  x  = x ,   i  =,.
and  p'x  = M.
Implicitly,  it  is  assumed  that  M > z=1  Pix?  so  that  the  problem  is  well  posed.
The  Lagrangean  function  is-11-
L =  U(x)  + X(M  - p'x)  +  Z  n.(x  x. ) 7:1  1i(X  1
where  A  and  the  n's  are  Lagrangean  multipliers.  The  solution  x*  of  (3.24)
satisfies  the  first-order  conditions:
aU(x*)_ (3.25)  -)  i  -n  0  x  t  = ax  - 1  1 aU(x*) (3.26)  9x  xpj  =0, j  = R+l,...,m
(3.27)  p'x*  = M.
The demanded quantities  x,  j  =  R+l,...,m,  of the unrationed goods can  be  solved
from (3.26)  and  (3.27)  conditional  on  the  rationed goods at  x,  i
from  (3.26)  and  (3.27)  conditional  on  the  rationed  goods  at  xi , i  = l,...,J;
(3.28)  x*  = Dj(p+  *.Pm  . M - z=  p  xx,...,x : (3.28)  x  i  ZDj  1  m  i=  PiXilX ' ' ' ' 'x) j  =  *+1,...,m
The  equations  (3.28) are  the conditional  demand equations  for the unrationed goods.
The virtual  prices  j,  j  =  1,...,  of the rationed goods at  xa,...,xt  are
(3.29)
-1  aU(x*) °.(x*)= 3  A  x.
DU(x  ,...,x0,  x~+1,...
= P  /
Ill
°  X* U(x  ,...,x  ,  x*+  ... ,x  )
xm
for  j  =  z+l,...,m.  Substituting the conditional  demand equations  (3.28) into
(3.29),  the  virtual  prices can  be  written as functions of the observed prices for
the unrationed goods, income and the rationed quantities:
(3.30)  (x*)  =  (pP  M;  ,.,xo (3.30)  j(x*)  =  j(p+l,.p  MR;  X,...,x)
m  R j  =  I,...,,
where  MR,  MR = M - i=1, Pix,  is  the  income  remaining  for  expenditure  on  unra-
tioned goods.  The virtual  prices and the conditional  demand equations as  functions
of  p, M  and  the  kink points provide conditions for regime occurrence as in  the
conditions  (3.23).-12-
Virtual  prices  for the rationed goods  can  also be derived from unconditional
(notional) demand equations.  The unconditional  (notional)  demand functions
Di(p, M),  i  = l,...,m,  are the solutions to  the unconstrained utility maximization
problem  max {U(x)jp'x = M}.  With the goods  i  rationed at quantities  xi,
i  =  1,  2,...,9,  the  virtual  prices which support the commodity vector  x*  =
(x,...,x°,  x*+ 1 ,...,x*)  as an  unconstrained utility maximum are characterized by
the  demand  relations:
(3.31)  xi = Di(S1' 2'"  ' p+1".'  Pm'  c),  i  = 1...,;
(3.32)  x  =  D(  E1'  2'  ""' %',  p1.'  P,  c),  j  =  ...
where
(3.33)  c  = M  +  z c R  (i  - i)x7
k  m
is  the  virtual  income,  and  x  +  m  px  = c  is  the corresponding  budget is  the virtual  income, and  ci=l  •i  +  zj=+l p
tangent  plane.  The  virtual  prices  Si  of the  rationed  goods  are  solutions  to  the
equations  (3.31)  to  (3.33).  The virtual  prices for the unrationed goods are the
market prices  (Neary and Roberts).  The virtual  price approach allows for a  wide
choice of functional  forms  because it  does not  necessarily require the specifica-
tion of the direct utility function.  As we demonstrate below, the use  of an  in-
direct utility function  representation of preference is  also attractive.
The  demanded  quantities  x,  j  = t+l,...,m  for the unrationed goods satisfy
the conditional  demand equations  (3.28).  With the  introduction of virtual  prices
i',  i  = 1,...,i  for the rationed goods,  x*  satisfies the unconditional  demand
equations,
(3.34)  x  = D (  ""  *  P+  ' m  MR +   =1  x  ,  j  =  +1,...,m
j  Djl5  5'·  ,  kl"  P  M  i=l  ii~-13-
where  MR = M  - =l  pix?.  By substituting the virtual  price equations  (3.30) into
S1  1i
(3.34),  one obtains the conditional  demand equations  (3.28),  Thus the conditional
demand equations  can  be  derived from the unconditional  demand equations  via the
5/
virtual  prices and vice-versa.  As a  function of prices  p+,...,pm  remaining
income  MR  and the rationed quantities  x?,  i  =  1,.., ,  the demand equations
(3.34) can  be  interpreted as conditional  demand equations conditional  on  xi ,
i  = 1,...,  .-14-
4.  Econometric Model  Specification:  Binding  Non-NegativeConstraints Case.
Estimation of the notional  demand equations requires the specification of a
functional  form with a  finite number of unknown parameters plus  stochastic compo-
nents.  These components reflect random preferences or other unexplained factors.
Let  e  be  the  vector of unknown parameters and  cthe vector of random com-
ponents.  The stochastic notional  demand equations  are
(4.1)  qi  =  Di(v;  e,  e)
where  v  =  p/M  is  a  vector of normalized prices.  These demand equations can be
derived either by maximizing the direct utility function  subject to the  budget con-
straint as  in  (2.3) or from an indirect utility function through Roy's  Identity.
Let  H(v;  e,  c)  be  an indirect utility function defined as
(4.2)  H(v;  e,  e)  = max  {U(q; e,  E)Ivq  =  1}.
q
Applying  Roy's Identity, the  notional  demand equations  are
(4.3)  qi=  H(v;  e,  E)  K  v  3H(v; es E)  i  ,K
(4.3)  q  j=l  jv  i  l
In  the analysis of quantity rationing, Deaton  (1981)  has noted that it  may be
difficult to analytically derive virtual  price functions  from most flexible func-
tion forms  for the indirect utility function.  For the case  of binding non-negativ-
ity constraints,  all  of the restricted demands are  zero rather than positive as in
the rationing  literature.  With zero restricted demands, the derivation of virtual
prices is  considerably simplified as  the denominator in  Roy's  Identity (4.3) drops
out of the  virtual  price functions.  If  demands for the first  L  goods are zero,
the virtual  prices  i  are solved from the equations
0  =  H(S'"..  , v;  ,  e)/av i i  = 1,...,L (4.4)-15-
and the  remaining  (positive) demands are
(H(91""'  6  L,  v 9 ;  e,  e)  /K  aH(  ""  '  ,  v;  e,  e) (4.5)  x.  =  /  v Sav  j1  j  av
i  = L+1,...,K.
As  an  illustration of the notional  demand approach, consider the translog in-
direct utility function of Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau  (1975),
K  1K  K  K
(4.6)  H(v;  e,  E)  =  z  Invi  + I-Z  . E  B  Inv  Inv  +  e.  Inv i=l  1  i=  j  i  i  =1  il  i
where  e is  a  K-dimensional  vector  of  normal  variables  N(O,  ).6/  A convenient
K  K  7/ normalization  is  = -1 and  i  . = i  0.-  The notional  share equations
derived  from  Roy's  Identity  are
a  +  ..  Inv.  +  E.
(4.7)  vq  =  -i+j=1  Dij  i  =1,..
K  K where  D = -1  + E.  z  .. =  Inv.  Consider  the  regime  for  which  the  quantity i=1  j=1  1  j
demanded for one of the goods  is  zero and positive for all  others,  i.e.,  x1 = 0,
x2 >  0,...,  xK >  0. The  virtual  price  1  as a  function of  v2,...,vK,  is
in  :K  +Inv.  +  E)/ 1n~1   -(al  +  2  1 j  Inv  + E)/11
The  remaining  positive  share  equations  are
Bil  Kil .- a  i+  K  SBil)lnv  +  -i i  811 i  j2 (  ij  - BIj  II 1 nv   -
(4.8)  v.x.  =  .
1  i-  1  B  •  01
rK.2  (1j)  1.  l )lnv  - (1 +  1  - 1e j=2  j  1 pj11  j  1  811  1
i  =  2,...,K
where  B..  =  zK  e...  Note from the above-equations that  E  can  be expressed as
functions of  xi and  El.  The  switching conditions for this demand regime are-16-
E 1  -(al  +j=1  j  Invj)
and  x  > O,  i  = 2,...,K.
Let  f(E 1) be  the  density function  of  c1  and  g(E2,...,  EK-lI'  )  be  the
conditional  density  function,  conditional  on  "1.  The  Jacobian  transformation
Jl(x,  El )  from  (e2'...  EK-_1)  to  (x2,...,  XK-1)  which  can  be  derived  from
(4.8),  is a function  of  x  and  cI . The  likelihood  function for  this  demand  regime
for  one  observation  is
+  K  1x  Envj)  2 1)  ""'  K-1  l)f(l)d1 -(aI  +   j=1  Ij  n)
where  i  i  = 2,...,K-1  are  functions  of  x  and  Fe  from  (4.8).  Now  consider
the  demand  regime  in  which  the  demands  for  the first two  commodities  are  zero  and  all




The  ei ,
E2.  The
-BK 1n 1   [1  +  1.  3  Invj  E
= -B  - B
1n 2   2  +  j=3  52j  nVy
f=  B  21  2  The  remaining positive shares are
$21  ý22J
K
ai  +  Bi  InS  + B2 Ing  +  E  B  Inv. +  E.
vix  =  X  il  1  12  2  jK=3  'j  J -1  +  .1  ln51  + B2 ln 2 + z  =3  .j  lnvj
i  = 3,...,K,  can  be  expressed  (from  (4.9)),  as  functions
regime  switching  conditions  are
i  =  3,...,K.
of  x,  E,  and
{E+  K
B 1  I  I  nv  -1  +   =3  j  nvji B  >  -Kl  ."
E2  0 nv  2 + j=3  B2j  1nvj
Let  n1]  =  B - 1  [1.  Furthermore,  let  g(c 3",.',  K-1lnl'  n2)  be  the  conditional
n2n  22-17-
density  function  of  (e3'"..  K-1 )   conditional  on  n1  and  n2 ,  and  f(n 1,  n2)
be  the  marginal  density of  n,  and  n2 .  The  Jacobian  transformation  J2(x,  nl'  n2 )
from  (3",...,  K-1)  to  (x3,..,  XK-1)  can  be  derived  from  (4.9)  and  is a func-
tion  of  x  and  n1,  n2 .  The  likelihood  function  for this  regime  for  one  observa-
tion  is
2  s1  2( x   nl'  n2)  (3""'  K-  ll  l'  n2)f(nl'  n2)dnldn2
s 1  I  Inv  ,  1  -1  1  =3  +  invi
where  =  - lnv  - B  j  and  E's  are  functions  of  x
22j=3  2j  2  nv
and  nl'  n2   derived  from  (4.9).  The  likelihood  function  for  other  regimes  can
similarly  be  derived.
Let  li(c)  be  a dichotomous  indicator  such  that  li(c)  = 1  if  the  observed
consumption  pattern  for  individual  i  is  the  demand  regime  c,  zero  otherwise.
Let  zc(xi;  e)  denote  the  likelihood  function  for  regime  c  for  sample  i.  The
likelihood  function  for  an  independent  sample  with  N  observations  is
N  lI(c) L = n• i= I  [Zc(xi;  e)] i c  1-18-
5.  The  Likelihood  Function  of  the  General  Demand  System.
Consider  a general  (notional)  demand  system  with  m  goods
(5.1)  xi  =  Di(p 1 '  P2"  '  ,  Pm,  M;  e)  +  i,  i  = 1,...,m
where  e  is  a vector  of  unknown  parameters  and  ei   is  the  disturbance  with  zero
mean.  The  budget  constraint  implies  that  m.=i  pici  = 0.  The  disturbances  ei ,
i  = 1,...,m  are  correlated  and  are  heteroscedastic.  Let  x*  =  (x*,...,x*)  be  the
observed  demand  quantity  vector.  Without  loss  of generality,  consider  the  general
regime  in  Theorem  1. The  criteria for  the  determination  of this  regime  are  the
conditions  (3.23).  The  virtual  prices  1'  2'"*'  .2-1  are  determined  by  the
following  equations:
£2-1
0 = Dj(  2""'  2z  -1'  P2  ...  Pm  MR  +  sk=  l kk(k); e)  +  ,
j  =  2,...,  l-  ;
(5.2)  2-1
xj(ij) = Dj(1  .2""'  2-1'  P,....'  ,m'  MR  +  k 1   kxk(k); e)  + sj.
j  =  £,""'  2-1
a2-1
where  MR  = M1  0...l  l  2-   o  l2'  "  k=  Pk(i).  The  remaining  demanded R  10001  0  -l  1  im  k=£1  kXk(i K k)
quantities  are
£2-1
x  = Dj(,  2'  '  £ 2- '  ",  '  . Pm'  MR  +  k=1  kx  );  e)  +  '.,
(5.3) 
2
j  =  £2'  1 2+1,...,m.
These  equations  provide  an  implicit function  from  the  disturbance vector
(cl""'  m-l  )  to  the  vector  (51'  E2""'  2£2-1,  2  x*  2'  2+ l   xm- 1  )   As
mi=l  Pii  =  0,  the  equation  x*  is  functionally  dependent  on  the  other  equations-19-
and  is  redundant.  A specified  joint  density  function  for  (El'..,  Eml)  implies  a
joint density function  for  (5  ,  •21'  x*,  x*2+..,m-),  which  can  be
derived  straightforwardly  since  the  Jacobian  matrix  is  easily  derived  from  (5.2)  and
(5.3).  Let  f(~ 1"  '  2- '  x*  ,  x*  2+1,.,Xm- 1)  denote  the  implied  joint  density
function.  It  follows  that  the  contribution  of  this  regime  to  the  likelihood  func-
tion  for  an  observation  is
2-(i2  + 1)  P(i  1  +1)  P  1 - 1 ,1  P1
S00  f-  -00  2  2
P2  ,  Pn  i0
C 2  92  k  1  1  x*2+1 90''   xm-
dgd• 2 . . -2  m- 1
The  evaluation  of  the  likelihood  function  may  be  cumbersome  and  expensive  if
there  are  integrals  with  dimensions  more  than  two.  It  is  an  open  question  whether
computationally  simple  estimation  methods  can  be  derived.-20-
6.  The  Firm's  Problems.
Our  analyses,  which  have  focused  on  consumer  demand  models,  can  be  extended  to
the  analyses  of  kink  points  in  production  economics.  The  firm's  problem  differs
from  that  of  the  consumer  in  the  constraints of  the  primal  problem  and  the  observ-
ability of profit  but  not  utility.  Kink  points  may  occur  because  of  binding  non-
negativity  constraints  or  inputs  or  outputs  in  a multiple  input  or  output  technology
or  as  a result  of  rationing  or  block  pricing.
Consider  the  profit maximization  problem  subject  to  quantities  constraints:
max  p'q - r'x
(6.1)  x,  q
subject to  F(q,  x)  = 0,  q  q > 0,  >x >0O
where  x  and  q  are  k x  1  and  M x  1  vectors  of  inputs  and  outputs  respectively,
and  x  and  q  are  the  upper  quantity  limits.  The  production  function  F  is  an
increasing  function  of  q's  and  a decreasing  function  of  x's.  Other  standard
regularity  conditions  on  F  such  as  differentiability  and  strict quasi-concavity
are  assumed.  To  illustrate  the  construction  of virtual  prices  from  the  production
technology  F,  let  us  consider  a rather  simple  regime  with  x*  =  (0,  x2,...,  x*)'
and  q* =  (ql'  q  ",.,  qM)'  where  the first  input  is  not utilized  and  the first
output  is  produced  at  the  quota  level.  The  Lagrangean  function  is
L = p'q  - r'x  + x(0 - F(q,  x))  + d'q +  p'x +  6'(q  - q)  +  w'(R  - x)
where p,  p,  a  and  w  are  vectors of  Lagrangean  multipliers.  This  regime  is
characterized  by  the  following  Kuhn-Tucker  conditions:
-r  - a F(  +  h  = 0,  0 ;
-r  - F(q*,  x*)  = O,  i  = 2,...  .K;
ri  BXaF(q*,  x*)
p-  ~aF(q * ,  x*)  =,
PI-^-^-^
F(q*,  x*)  = 0,
-21-
0,  6s >  0;
j  = 2,...,M.
q*  >  0,  x*  >  0.
Define  the  virtual  price  Edl  for
at  (x 1 = 0,  q1)  as
input  1  and  virtual  price  Ssl  for output  1




Since  F(q*  x*)  a  F(q*,  x* )  >
axl  aql
It  follows  that  1  =  rl  - dl  and  61  = P
characterized  by
1  0  <  xt  < x pl  >dl  s  0  < q  <  ,
Pl 
s l 9 '   0  < qt  <qj
*1
.dl  and  E5s  are  strictly positive.
- sl.  Therefore  this  regime  is
i = 2,...,K
j  = 2,...,M.
Input  1 is  not used because the market price is  too  high and output  1 is  prod-
uced  up to  the quota limit because the virtual  price is  not.  This technique can be
easily generalized to  other regimes.
The case of increasing block prices in  inputs can be reformulated into the
framework  (6.1).  Consider the  simple case of a  single output  x  with production
function  q  =  f(x).  Assume the  price of input  x  is rl  if  the  purchased amount
is  not  greater  than  x((1)  but  a  higher  price  r2  for  amounts  in  excess  of  x1(1).
Hence  the  cost  c(x)  is
and-22-
c(x)  = rjX,  ,  if  xx  <  (1);
=  r1x 1(1)  +  r 2 (x  - x1(1)),  if  x  > x1(1).
The  problem  max  {pq  - c(x)lq  = f(x),  x  >  0}  can  be  rewritten  into  an  identical
x
problem  with  two  perfectly  substitutable  inputs:
max  pq  - r1x1 - r2x2
xl,  x2
subject  to  q = f(x 1  +  x2),  0 <x i  <x 1 (1),  x2  >0.
As  the  price of  x1  is  less  than  x2,  x1  will  always  be  purchased  first.  x2   will
be  purchased  only  if  xl  has  been  purchased  up  to  its  upper limit  x1(1).  x1(1)  is
a kink  point  in  this  model.
Similarly,  the  decreasing  block  prices  in outputs  can  also  be  formulated  in
the  framework  (6.1).  Consider  a single  output  case  that  the  output  quantity  q  can
be  sold at  price  pl  if  the  quantity  is  not  greater  than  the  quota  amount  q(1);
however,  quantities  in  excess  of  q(1)  can  only  be  sold  at  a lower  price  p2. The
revenue  function  will  be
R(q)  =  p q   ,  if  q <q(1);
=  P 1q(1)  +  p2 (q  - q(1)),  if  q > q(l).
The  profit maximization  problem  max  {R(q)  - rxlq  = f(x)}  can  be  rewritten  indent-
x,  q
ically as  a model  with  two  perfectly  substitutable  outputs:
max  p1ql  +  P 2q2  - rx
ql'  q2,  x
subject  to  q  + q2 = f(x),  0  <  ql  <  q(1),  q2 >  0.
The  quantity  q(1)  is  a  kink  point  in  this  model.-23-
Instead of the direct approach of profit maximization with a  specified pro-
duction technology, one can also consider dual  approaches through the specification
of profit or cost functions.  Application of Shephard's lemma  or the Hotelling-
McFadden  lemma  (see, e.g.,  McFadden  [1978])  provides  (notional)  input  demand and
output supply functions.  Virtual  prices for the kink points can  be  solved directly
from these functions.  In  the next  two sections, the specification and estimation of
a  translog  profit and cost  functions is  described in  order to  clearly illustrate
this approach.-24-
7.  Econometric  Models  With  Translog  Profit  and  Cost  Functions:  Corner  Solution
Cases.
The  variable  translog  profit function  with fixed  factors  z = (Z1,...,ZL)'  is
K+M  1  K+M  K+M  L 1nn  =  E 00  +K+M  Invi  +  M  IE+  M  ijnv  . nvj  +  L  E  1n z
In  =  00  i=l  iO  1  2  i=l  j=l  ij  1  j  Z=l  O  kInz
(7.1)
1  L  L  K+M  L
+  L=l  j=1  Y  nj  I  nz.  I  + ZK   1  M  l  Inv.  Inz. 23k=1  =1  t  j9i=l  =  1lit  1
where  v  = r.  i  = 1,...,K  and  vi  =  i-K  for  i  = K+1,...,  M+K.  For  computa- 1  1  1  1-K
tional  tractability,  random  elements  are  introduced  in  the  linear  terms,  as  follows
K+M  1  K+M  K+M K+M  (".  + Ei)lnv  +  E  Z  j=  Inv  Invj Inn  = a00 +  Z  i=l  (aiO  i  i=l  j=l  a  nvi  n L  1  L  L  K+M  L (7.2)  +  LC  l  nz  + - L  K  n  +  +  L  +  '  Inv.  Inz =l  YtO  22  j=l  j=1  Yj  Inz  j  i1  =1  1i2  i  P
+  0
where  e  =  (Eo ,  E9l...,  'K+M)  is  assumed  to  be  multivariate  normal  N(O,  n).  The
Hotelling-McFadden  lemma  implies  that  the  notional  cost  shares  of  profit  are
(7.3)  - rx  +  M a  Inv  +  E  Inz  +  e  i  =,...,K
i  j(7.3)  1  3  3l  :I  2i
and  the  notional  revenue  shares  of  profit are
Piqi  K+M  L (7.4)  =  +  n.  +  i  nz  +  iK  =  1   . M
(7  i+KO +  j=l  i+K,j  j3  =1  i+K,t  +  Ei+K  =
Virtual  prices  corresponding  to  zero  inputs  and  outputs  can  be  solved  from  the  share
equations.  Without  loss  of  generality,  consider  the  regime  where  the  first  two  in-
puts  are  zero.  The  corresponding  virtual  prices  are  v*  and  v2,  defined  by  the
following  equations:
K+M  L  lnz  + 0  =  l  + all  Inv*  +  12  Inv*  +  j=3  Clj  nv  +  =l  1.nz  l+  E-25-
K+M  Lnz
0  =  "20  +  "21  1nv*  + a22  In2  v3  a2j  nij +  =1  B2  z  +  •  2
The  solutions  are  linear  in  c1  and  e2:
1  VL/  I
+  EK+M  lnv  +  L=  lnz  +  E:
all  a2  "10  +  j=3 alj  n  +   =1  1  )Iz
K+M  L
2  22a  a20  + Cj=3  a2j  1nvj  + 2=1  2  1nz  +  .
The remaining non-zero  share equations are:
(7.5)
where  s
- - 1   K+M  Invj  + ZL  Inz  +  L
visi  (all  c2  010  +   j=3  clxj  Inv~ +  =  Bl  nzt  +  E
- (ail  i2  K+M  L  nz
"21  222  20  +   j=3  a2j  1n  +  z=1  2  nz  +   2
K+M  L +  cEij  I  nv  +  =1l  i  Inz  +  e  i  = 3,...,K+M
j=3  and  are  linear  in  . The  conditional  profit  function  for
(-"',  q')'  and are linear in E.  The conditional  profit function for
this  regime  is
VKLI
InT  =  a00o  +  (al0  + El)lnv  +  (a20  +  E2 )1nv2  +  'i=
1 2  2  n  n  1  nv  2   K+M +  - E.  ..  1nvte  v1ny4  z  +  E.  0  ., 2  i=l  j=l 1 j  1  j  2 i=l  j=3  ij
(7.6)
1  K+M  2  1  K+M  K+M + 2  i=3  j=1  aij  Invi  1  i=3  =3  ij
+ E  Inz  + I  +L  l  nz  Inz.  + +  =l  >O  9.  2  R91  j=1  j  P I
+ E  K+ML  Inv.  Inz  +
i=3  Z=l  Bi  1  9  0
which  is  nonlinear  in  el  and  E2  but  linear  in  co ,  e i ,
first  two  regime  switching  conditions  are
-1 - K+M  L Inv  -c1  +  iEK  IXj  Invj  +
1nv  ll  c1 2   20  + j=3  j  n  +   =1
K+M  L
nv2  21  a2212  20  +  j=3  a2j  Invy  :+IE
3  (caO  +  i)lnvi
Invw  Invj
Inv i  lnvj
12  L _1  =  1  9.s  1  9.
i  = 3,..,,K+M.  The
*-  -l
Bl  Inzt .   all  12  E
2  1 Inz  "21 "22 jTo  guarantee  that  the  estimated  variable profit  function  is  linear  homogeneous  in
prices,  or  equivalently  that  the  estimated  share  equations  are  homogeneous  of  degree
zero,  the  following  restrictions  on  parameters  and  disturbances  must  hold:
K+M  K+M  K+M K=  l•  1,  ij  0,  aij  ji  for all  i,  j;  zr +  0 i=l  iO  =  j=l  3 iijij  i  = 0
K+M for all  z;  zi=  =  0.
The  latter equality  implies  that  the  stochastic  components  are  statistically
linearly  dependent.  Therefore,  one  of  the  non-zero  share  equations  can  be  deleted
in  the  formulation  of  the  likelihood.  Define  the  random  variables  wl  and  w2  as
Wl1  all  a 12  E 1
,w2  "21  22j
Let  f(E O ',  3 "...,  SK+M-lll'  w2)  be  the  conditional  density  function,  conditional
on  wl  and  w2'  and  g(wl,  w2)  be  the  marginal  bivariate  density function.  As
S3  3
the  Jacobian  of the  transformation  (cO'  C3"",  K+M-1)  to  (In,  =,..,
vK+M-1  K+M-1)  is  unity,  the  likelihood  function  for this  regime  with  one  observa-
tion  is
(7.7 0   3  S3  VK+M-1 SK+M-l 1 (7.7)  f(lnT  *,  -=  ,...,  - ,  2)g(w,  w2)d 1dw 2
STr  2  1  2
clw  Inv13 where  =
c2 Inv2
I  I  ,K+ML  - r  L
-1a  + E," 0  j  a.1 nv  +  Et j=3  13  j R=1
+K+M  L
20  -+  i=3  a2i  Inv  i  += 1
Likelihood functions for other regimes can  similarly be derived, as  well  as the
likelihoods  for  cost  functions.
The  likelihood  (7.7) utilizes  both the  share equations and the profit function
to derive the  full  information estimator.  If  only the share equations are used, the
k  -ý -f  %) %W  M%  %  O-27-
estimation procedure is  less efficient  but the corresponding  likelihood function is
simpler because  share equations are  linear in  the disturbances.  Nevertheless, the
likelihood function will  still  involve multivariate normal  probabilities,-28-
8.  An  Application:  Estimation  of  an  Energy  Cost  Function.
In  this section,  we apply the econometric model  set out above to the estimation
of a  translog energy cost function.  The production structure used in  deriving energy
demand  relationships  parallels  that  of  Fuss  (1977)  and  Pindyck  (1979).  First,  it  is
assumed  that  the  production  function  is  weakly  separable  in  energy  inputs.  Thus,  the
cost-minimizing mix of energy  inputs  is  independent of the mix of other factors.
Second, the energy aggregate is  assumed  homothetic in  its  components so  that  cost
minimization  becomes  a  two-stage  procedure:  optimize  the  mix  of  fuels  which  make  up
the energy aggregate and then choose the cost minimizing mix of the energy aggregate,
capital,  labor,  materials,  and  other  factors.  Here  we  will  only  estimate  the  energy
aggregator  function from which  interfuel  substitution elasticities can  be  derived.
The data  used in  the estimation  came from the raw data tapes  of the annual
industrial  surveys  (Survey  Perusahaan  Industri)  of  Indonesia.  The  sample  consists  of
establishments manufacturing fabricated metal  products, machinery and equipment
(ISIC classification 38).  There are 1410 observations.  Three fuels  are identified:
(purchased)  electricity,  fuel  oils  and  other  fuels.8/
Local  market  price  data  for  energy  inputs  were  available  for  all  firms.  The
substantial  spatial variation of prices characteristic of island Indonesia,  as well
as the large  sample size, make it  possible to estimate price response from cross-
section  data  with  reasonable  precision.
All  three  fuels went unconsumed by a  substantial  number of firms  (Table 1)  and
many  firms  consumed  only  one  of  the  three.  Many  firms  in  Indonesia  use  prime  movers
or generate all  or some of their electricity in-plant, which is  why only 60% of
firms  purchased electricity.  We expect that fuel  oils and other petroleum fuels,
which are used to power electric generators and prime movers, are close substitutes
for purchased electricity.
The (unobserved) price  index for a  unit of energy is  the unit translog cost-29-
function
(8.1)  In  P  =  o0  + Z.  a  Inpi  +  I  j  a  npi  np E  00  i 0  1 2ij  i j
where  i,  j  = 1  (electricity),  2  (fuel  oil)  and  3  (other  petroleum  fuels),  and
Pi  is  the  price  of the  i th- fuel.  Randomness  as  well  as  firm  specific  character-
istics  are  allowed  to  influence  demands  by  writing  the  parameters  aiO  as
(8.2)  iO  =  iO  +  jij  Cj  +  i  i  = 1,  2,  3
where  Cj  is  the  jth  firm  characteristic  and  e  is  a three-dimensional  vector  of
normal  variables  N(O,  z).  The  firm  characteristics  C  include  dichotomous  vari-
ables  for  Java/outside  Java  and  urban/rural  location  and  the  year  the  establishment
began  operation.  The  share  equations  corresponding  to  the  cost  function  (8.1,  8.2)
are
(8.3)  si  = Yi  +  Ej  Yj  Cj  + Ej  .i Inpj  +  Ei   i  1,  2,  3
from  which  virtual  prices  for  zero  demands  are  readily solved  for.
The  maximum  likelihood estimates  of  the  parameters  of  the  cost  function,  ob-
tained  using  the  quadratic  hill-climbing methods  in  GQOPT  package  of Goldfeld  and
Quandt,  are  presented  in  Table  2.  The  asymptotic  t-ratios  reported  in  the  table
suggest  that  all  three  firm  characteristics  are  significant  determinants  of  energy
demand.  A likelihood  ratio  that  supports  this  contention  (x2 (6) = 354.13).
Table  3 provides  estimates  of  interfuel  (partial)  fuel  price elasticities.  Own
and  cross-price  elasticities are  fairly large  in  magnitude.  Electricity is  a  sub-
stitute with  both  fuel  oil  and  other  fuels.  Its  large  cross-price elasticities  sug-
gest  how  close  electricity is  for alternative  fuels.  On  the  other  hand,  fuel  oil
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For  parameters  yij:  i  =  1  (electricity),  i  = 2  (fuel  oil),  j  =  0  (intercept),
j  = 1  (Java),  j  = 2  (urban),  j  = 3  (start-up  year).  For  parameters  aij:
i,  j  = 1  (electricity),  i,  j  = 2  (fuel  oil),  i,  j  = 3  (other  fuels).
b  Other parameters are easily derived from the homogeneity and symmetry conditions.
a-32-
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In  this  paper, we  have considered the specification and estimation of models of
consumers and producer demand with kink points.  These kink points can arise from
binding non-negativity constraints, quantity rationing, block prices or production
quotas.  The models specified recognize that observed demands are the result of
optimal  choice.  The basic  structures can  be  either a  specific utility function or
indirect utility function for consumer demand analysis, and a  production function or
profit  function  for  production  analysis.
Our analysis unifies the direct and dual  approaches in  consumption and produc-
tion economics with kink points.  The presence of kink points divides the demand
schedule or production schedule  into  different regimes.  Switching conditions, which
determine the occurrence probabilities  of different demand regimes,  are provided.
Our approach utilizes the concept of virtual  prices originated in  the quantity
rationing literature.  The virtual  prices  transform binding quantities  into non-
binding quantities and  provide a  rigorous justification for structural  change in  the
observed demand functions across regimes.  The comparison of virtual  prices with
market prices is  sufficient to determine  regime occurrences.  Such comparisons  are
intuitively appealing as  the virtual  prices are actually reservation or shadow
prices.
As  an application of our approach, we  have estimated a  three  input translog
energy cost function.  As  some of these three fuels are close substitutes, non-
negativity constraints are often binding.  The empirical  results are appealing and
computation was  inexpensive.  Elsewhere, we estimate a demand system for five ag-
gregated commodities  using a sample of 767  households from a  budget survey for
Indonesia  (Pitt and  Lee, 1983),  The computational  cost for estimating that system
with more than  50 parameters  in  which there were at most two non-consumed goods  for
each household was  still  quite moderate.  However,  because the econometric model  is-34-
highly non-linear  and  multivariate  in  nature,  computational  difficulty and  cost  may
increase  rapidly with  the  number  of  non-consumed  commodities.-35-
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(1)  On the other hand,  commodities such as  electricity often have  decreasing
block pricing which creates a  concave  budget set.  Concave budget  sets create
special  problems  and  will  be  considered  elsewhere.
(2)  Survey  sampling  errors,  such  as  reporting  errors,  may  alone  be  sufficient
to  introduce zero quantities in  observed  samples.  Pure measurement error prob-
lems will  not be  considered in  this  paper.  Deaton and  Irish  (1982) suggest a
relatively simple model  of demand with reporting errors.
(3)  Two  textbook  examples  on  increasing  block  input  prices  in  production  can  be
found  in  Henderson  and  Quandt  (1980).  One  of  the  examples  is  on  discontinuous
labor contract for which  the firm has to pay higher wage rates  for overtime
labor.
(4)  Our analysis can  be generalized in  a  straightforward manner to  incorporate
quantity  rationing  with  a  fixed  amount  of  quantity.  This  case  is  the  main  con-
cern of the studies  of Deaton  (1981)  and Blundell  and Walker  (1982).
(5)  Browning  (1983) has  shown that the unconditional cost function can
theoretically be  recovered from a  conditional  cost function.  The necessary
conditions for the conditional  cost function are also sufficient for the  recovery
of the unconditional  cost function when the rationed quantities  are positive.
Our approach starts with the unconditional  functions.  Identification in  this
paper refers to  parameter identification given functional  forms for the uncondi--36-
tional  functions.
(6)  One  can  also  specify  other  distributions  if  they  are  of  interest.  Normal-
ity  is  attractive  because  of  its additive  property.
(7)  K
(7)  It  is  necessary to specify  i=l  ci  =  0,  since, for the homogenous case
zK   . = 0  so  that  D  =  -1  in  the share equations  (4.11) and the sum of the i=l  1i
shares is  unity,
(8)  The  category  "other  fuel"  includes  diesel  oils,  gas  oils  and  kerosene.  The
three categories  of fuels delimited in  this study comprised 86% of the value of
energy  used  by  firms  in  1978.-37-
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